1 As this paper discusses the reactions of current account imbalances, Ireland, which has a largely balanced current account, will not be in our focus. 2 For example, Attinasi, Checherita and Nickel fi nd in a dynamic panel approach that higher expected current account defi cits are associated with higher sovereign bond yield spreads. See M. A t t i n a s i , C. C h e c h e r i t a and C. N i c k e l : What explains the surge in euro area sovereign spreads during the fi nancial crisis?, ECB working paper No. 1131 No. , 2009 . Klepsch and Wolmershäuser in their otherwise insightful study do not control for current account balances. See C. K l e p s c h , T. Wo l m e r s h ä u s e r : Yield spreads on EMU government bonds -how the fi nancial crisis has helped investors to rediscover risk, in: Intereconomics, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2011 , pp. 169-176. 3 OECD: Economic Outlook, No. 89, 2011 The European debt crisis is, at fi rst sight, of a fi scal nature: public debt levels in Greece, Ireland and Portugal are so high that it is doubtful whether these states will be able to raise the funds needed to fulfi l their obligations. The confi dence of fi nancial markets in debtor countries depends, however, to a large extent on indicators that relate to the economy as a whole, including fi rms and private households. This is because the present value of all future tax receipts and thus of the state's ability to pay must be lower than the present value of all future incomes earned by all domestic agents. The external position of the economy has an important role in this inequality: adverse international investment positions such as a lot of external debts, as in the case of Ireland, put income prospects as well as the rating of the sovereign at risk. 1 Current account balances are also regarded as informative indicators 2 : if current expenditures in an economy are substantially higher than current incomes, so that the international investment position is steadily deteriorating, it might be diffi cult for the public authorities to markedly increase the share of income that is distracted from private use in order to meet the obligations of the state. This reasoning is behind the fact that Greece and Portugal, with current account defi cits of about 10% of GDP, lost access to capital markets in 2010, while the UK, with a relatively modest current account defi cit of about 2.5% in 2010, is still regarded as a trustworthy debtor, although the British structural public defi cit, at 8.3% in 2010, was larger than that of Greece (6.5%) or Portugal (7.6%). Thus, an important prerequisite for Greece and Portugal's regaining access to capital markets appears to be a signifi cant decrease in the current account defi cits of these countries.
The Baltic Economies: Dramatic Turnaround Despite Fixed Exchange Rates
It has frequently been argued recently that a fundamental decrease in current account defi cits is only possible if wages and prices signifi cantly devalue relative to foreign cost and price levels. In the case of the euro area member countries in 6 Even so, the current account balances turned around in 2009 because expenditure on imports collapsed: in Latvia and Lithuania by 36%, in Estonia by 32%. Meanwhile, in Portugal imports decreased by 18% and in Greece by 25% -huge numbers in normal times, but not unusual ones during the Great Recession, and indeed moderate ones compared to what happened in the Baltic economies. The swift improvement in competitiveness was obviously not decisive for turning the current account balances in these countries. Instead, the collapse of domestic demand that was more dramatic than in any other EU country played the key role.
The question now to be answered is: why was the collapse of domestic demand in the Baltic economies so deep? In particular, it was much deeper than in Greece and Portugal in any phase since the Great Recession hit (see again Figure 2 ), although since 2009 the macroeconomic situation in these southern economies appears to be as precarious as it was at any time in the Baltic states. One might think that the international rescue funds make the difference: they enable a continuous fi nancing of the high public defi cits. The programmes prescribe that the defi cits are to be reduced speedily in the coming years, but not in an abrupt way. Estonia and Lithuania did not need international help, as capital markets kept confi dence in the soundness of public fi nances during the crisis. Matters stood differently in Latvia: here, the state took over the business and liabilities of the second largest commercial bank in the country, Parex, at the peak of the fi nancial crisis in November 2008 in order to prevent the institute's 6 Comparing the fi gures for 2009 with those for 2008, income from exports of goods and services was down by 20% in Estonia, 17% in Latvia and 25% in Lithuania (balance of payments data). In Greece the collapse was 21%, in Portugal 15%.
Different Reactions to the Crisis
Why did the current accounts of the Baltic countries behave so differently from what we see in the euro area crisis countries? Did Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania regain international competitiveness via a swift real devaluation during their deep recessions? 5 Wages indeed fell quite dramatically in 2009 and 2010. This adjustment, however, allowed the economies to achieve a competitive position that was (measured by nominal unit labour costs) only as strong as in 2007, when current account defi cits were at record levels ( Figure 3) . Indeed, ex-5 According to the ECB, the fl exibility of wages was -in addition to sizable fi scal consolidation, structural reforms and measures to stabilise the banking system -pivotal for the swift macroeconomic adjustment of the Baltic economies (see ECB Monthly Bulletin, June 2011, pp. 17-19) . This paper will argue below that such a view is in danger of overrating the short-run effects of adjustments in the real economy and of economic policy. 
